Divide and Conquer? The Russian Plan for Ownership of the Caspian Sea by Dunlap, Ben N
Boston College International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 27 | Issue 1 Article 4
12-1-2004
Divide and Conquer? The Russian Plan for
Ownership of the Caspian Sea
Ben N. Dunlap
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr
Part of the Law of the Sea Commons, and the Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law
School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ben N. Dunlap, Divide and Conquer? The Russian Plan for Ownership of the Caspian Sea, 27 B.C. Int'l
& Comp. L. Rev. 115 (2004), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol27/iss1/4
DIVIDE AND CONQUER? THE RUSSIAN 
PLAN FOR OWNERSHIP OF 
THE CASPIAN SEA 
BEN N. DUNLAP* 
Abstract: The search for alternative sources of oil has renewed U.S. 
interest in the Caspian Sea. Bordered by Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, and the 
Central Asian states of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, the Caspian Sea 
contains up to thirty-three billion barrels of proven oil reserYes. The legal 
status of the Caspian has remained unresolved since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, however. In the early 1990s Russia joined with Iran to argue 
for common ownership of the sea by all five states, aiming for Yeto power 
over Western involvement in the region. Now, Russia argues for diYiding 
the seabed (and the oil and gas underneath it) into national sectors, 
while leaving most of the surface waters for common management and 
use. The Russian solution offers political and economic benefits to both 
Russia and the United States in the short run, but may be an unsound 
basis for long-term stability in the Caspian region. 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United 
States, fears about U.S. dependence on Persian Gulf oil have in-
tensified} With three-fifths of the world's oil reserves concentrated in 
the Persian Gulf, the United States and other Western nations have 
increased efforts to ensure the continued availability of oil elsewhere 
in the event of a catastrophic terrorist attack or a destabilizing conflict 
in the region.2 As a result, the search for alternative sources of oil has 
renewed U.S. interest in the potentially oil-rich Caspian Sea.3 
*Ben N. Dunlap is the Solicitations and Symposium Editor of the Boston College InteJc 
national & Compamtive Law Review. 
I Addicted to Oi~ THE EcoNOMIST, Dec. 15, 2001, at 9. 
2 I d.; A Dangerous Addiction, THE EcoNOMIST, Dec. 15, 2001, at 15. 
3 See Michael Lelyveld, Caspian: Presidi!Jits Launch Constrttction of Oil Pipeline, RADIO 
FREE EUROPE-RADIO LIBERTY (Sept. 18, 2002), at http:/ /www.rferJ.org/nca/features/ 
2002/09/18092002154755.asp [hereinafter Lel)'\·eld, Presidents Launch Const11tction]; 
Lucian Pugliaresi, Energy Secmity: How Valuable is Caspian Oil?, Caspian Studies Program 
(Jan. 2001), http:/ /ksgnotesl.harvard.edu/BCSIA/Library.nsf/pubs. 
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Bordered by Russia, Azerbaijan, Iran, and the Central Asian states 
of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, the Caspian Sea contains an esti-
mated seventeen to thirty-three billion barrels of proven oil reserves.4 
In the early 1990s, U.S. oil companies Amoco and Chevron pioneered 
the development of Caspian oil reserves off the coasts of Azerbaijan 
and Kazakhstan.5 The U.S. government championed the construction 
of a new oil pipeline to bypass Russia and Iran by transporting Cas-
pian oil to Western markets via Azerbaijan and Turkey.6 Uncertainty 
about the Caspian's legal status, however, has hindered development 
of the sea's oil reserves.7 Soviet-Iranian treaties governed the Cas-
pian's use in the Soviet era, but since the breakup of the Soviet Union 
in 1991, the new Caspian states have failed to agree on how to divide 
its vast resources.s 
In the early 1990s, Russia joined with Iran to argue for common 
ownership of the sea by all five states, aiming for veto power over West-
ern involvement in the region.9 Now, Russia argues for dividing the 
seabed (and the oil and gas underneath it) into national sectors, while 
leaving most of the surface waters for common management and use.10 
More importantly, Russia has signed bilateral treaties with Azerbaijan 
and Kazakhstan, effectively dividing the northern part of the seabed 
4 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, CoUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEFS: CASPIAN 
SEA REGION, at http:/ /www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/caspian.html (Aug. 2003) [hereinaf-
ter D.O.E., CAsPIAN SEA REGION]. 
5 See Fiona.Hill, Pipeline DTea?lts in the Caucasus, in CAUCASUS AND THE CAsPIAN SEMI-
NAR TRANSCRIPTS (SDI Projected., 1996), http:/ /www.ciaonet.org/conf/jfk01 [hereinaf-
ter Hill, Pipeline Drea11ts]. 
6 /d.; ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, CASPIAN SEA REGION: OIL EXPORT 
OPTIONS, at http:/ /www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/caspoile.html (July 2002) [hereinafter 
D.O.E., EXPORT OPTIONs]; Lelyveld, Presidents Launch Construction, supra note 3. 
7 See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, CAsPIAN SEA REGION: LEGAL ISSUES, 
at http:/ /www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/casplaw.hunl (July 2002) [hereinafter D.O.E., LEGAL 
ISSUES]. 
8 See id.; see also Geoffrey Kemp, U.S.-Imnian Relations: Competition or Cooperation in the 
Caspian Sea Basin, in ENERGY AND CoNFLICT IN CENTRAL AsiA AND THE CAucAsus 148-49 
(Robert Ebel & Rajan Menon eds., 2000) [hereinafter ENERGY AND CONFLICT]; Peter Rut-
land, Paradigms for Russian Policy in the Caspian Region, in ENERGY AND CoNFLICT, supra, at 
177. 
9 See D.O.E., LEGAL IssuEs, supra note 7; see also Kemp, supra note 8, at 148-49; Rut-
land, supra note 8, at 177. 
10 Vystuplenie Prezidenta Rossii V.V. Putina na vstreche glav prikaspiiskikh gosudarstv 
[Russian President Vladimir Putin, Address at the Summit of Caspian Heads of State], 
available at http:/ /www.mid.ru (Apr. 23, 2002) [hereinafter Putin Address]. 
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into Russian, Azerbaijani, and Kazakhstani national sectors.ll Iran in-
sists that the old Soviet-Iranian treaties are still in force and refuses to 
sign or recognize any bilateral treaties carving up the sea until a new 
multilateral convention is concluded by all five Caspian states.l2 
This Note examines Russia's proposed solution for the Caspian's 
legal status and its implications for U.S. interests in the region. Part I 
provides a brief history of Caspian oil and an overview of post-1991 
attempts to resolve the Caspian's legal status. Part II discusses pro-
posed legal solutions, with special attention to Russia's proposal and 
its legal validity. Part III analyzes the implications of Russia's proposed 
resolution for Russia, Iran, and the United States. Part IV concludes 
that the Russian solution offers political and economic benefits to 
both Russia and the United States in the short run, but may be an un-
sound basis for long-term stability in the Caspian region. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Short Histmy of Caspian Oil 
Caspian oil fields began producing oil near Baku, Azerbaijan m 
1871 and accounted for half the world's still limited production in 
1900.13 The Soviets expanded their extraction operations, but never 
fully explored the 700-mile-long Caspian Sea for new oil fields, in part 
because they lacked the technology to exploit effectively the reserves 
they found.14 
Following the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, discovery of 
significant oil reserves in the Caspian basin cast the region in a new 
light.15 Early estimates were as high as 659 billion barrels, or two-thirds 
of the world's known reserves.16 Most of the oil discovered is located off 
the coasts of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and TurkmenistanP Azerbaijan 
11 See D.O.E., LEGAL IssuEs, supra note 7; Sergei Blagov, Kazakhstan Pushes for Trilateml 
Caspian Deal, AsiA TIMES ONLINE, Oct. 10, 2002, at http:/ /www.atimes.com/atimes/Cent-
ral_Asia/Dj10Ag01.html [hereinafter Blagov, Kazakhstan]. 
12 See D.O.E., LEGAL IssuEs, supra note 7. 
13 See Hill, Pipeline Dreams, supm note 5; Bruce R. Kuniholm, The Geopolitics of the Cas-
pian Basin, 54 MIDDLE E.J. 546 (2002), LEXIS, Nexis Library, Magazine File. 
14 D.O.E., CASPIAN SEA REGION, supra note 4. 
15 See Kuniholm, supra note 13. 
16 !d. 
17 D.O.E., CASPIAN SEA REGION, supra note 4; ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF 
ENERGY, CASPIAN SEA REGION: RESERVES AND PIPELINES TABLES, at http:/ jwww.eia.doe. 
gov I emeu/ cabs/ caspgrph.html (july 2002). 
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and Kazakhstan, in particular, have concluded deals with foreign oil 
companies to extract Caspian oil and transport it to world markets. IS 
Firms in the United States have acquired seventy-five percent of 
Kazakhstan's onshore Tengiz oil field, while a consortium including 
Italy's ENI, British Gas, ExxonMobil, France's TotalFinaElf, and Royal 
Dutch Shell is developing the newly discovered offshore Kashagan 
field.I9 British Petroleum (BP) is leading the Azerbaijan International 
Operating Company's efforts to discover, extract, and transport oil 
located off Azerbaijan's coast.2° Chief among those efforts is the con-
struction of a new pipeline from Baku, Azerbaijan, through Tbilisi, 
Georgia, to Ceyhan, Turkey, which U.S. policymakers hope will serve 
as the main export pipeline for Caspian oil. 21 
In addition to U.S. and Western European firms, Russia's largest 
oil company, LUKoil, is currently a consortium member in Kazakh 
extraction and transport projects and is negotiating a possible invest-
ment in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline.22 Until recently, 
LUKoil also held a stake in a sizable Azerbaijani oil field. 23 
B. Caspian Geopolitics 
Drawn by cheap oil and the Caspian's strategic location at the 
crossroads of east and west, regional and world powers have converged 
on the Caspian region to stake out and defend their political and eco-
nomic interests.24 In particular, the United States, seeking to diversify its 
energy supply and bolster the independence of the former Soviet states 
in tl1e region, has been adamant in its support for multiple pipelines to 
transport Caspian oil to Western markets. 25 U.S. policies for Caspian oil 
development benefit primarily Azerbaijan, Georgia, and United States' 
1s D.O.£., CASPIAN SEA REGION, supra note 4. 
19 Jan H. K.·dicki, Caspian Energy at the Crossroads, FoREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept.-Oct. 2001, 
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Magazine File. 
20 Id. 
21 See id.; D.O.£., CASPIAN SEA REGION, supra note 4. 
22 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, KAZAKHSTAN: MAJOR OIL AND NATIJRAL 
GAs PROJECTS, at http:/ /www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/kazaproj.html (June 2002) [hereinaf-
ter DEP'T OF ENERGY, KAzAKHSTAN]; Michael Lelyveld, Iran/Azerbaijan: U.S. Rejects Military 
Involvement in Caspian Dispute, RADIO FREE EuROPE-RADio LIBERTY (Mar. 15, 2002), at 
http:/ /www.rferl.org/ nca/ features/2002/03 I 15032002113328.asp. 
23 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, AzERBAIJAN: PRODUCTION-SHARING 
AGREEMENTS, at http:/ /www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/azerproj.html (June 2002) [herein-
after DEP'T OF ENERGY, AzERBAIJAN]. 
24 See generally Kuniholm, supra note 13; Robert Ebel & Rajan Menon, Introduction to 
ENERGY AND CONFLICT, supra note 8, at 4-10. 
25 Ebel & Menon, Introduction, supra note 24, at 5. 
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NATO ally, Turkey, by routing the BTC pipeline through those coun-
tries.26 The BTC pipeline will also benefit Kazakhstan if plans to export 
Kazakhstani oil through it come to fruition.27 As a result, throughout 
the 1990s, U.S. pipeline diplomacy alienated Russia and fueled Iran's 
fears of a long-term U.S. presence in the region that would exclude it 
from any future development of Caspian oil. 28 
The strategic importance of the Caspian is underscored by secu-
rity concerns in the region. 29 To the northwest, Russian forces con-
tinue to battle separatists in Chechnya.30 To the west, an uneasy peace 
holds in Nagorno-Karabagh, the predominantly Armenian enclave in 
Azerbaijan that was the scene of horrific ethnic warfare in the early 
1990s.31 To the east, Tajikistan suffered a protracted civil war in the 
1990s.32 Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan both have faced incursions by Is-
lamic militant terrorists in recent years.33 
Since September 11, 2001, the United States has been particularly 
concerned about nonstate actors and the threat of terrorism in the 
Caucasus and Central Asia.34 Proximity to the markets of Europe and 
Iran and the porous borders of the former Soviet states make the Cas-
pian a convenient conduit for narcotics produced in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, and for weapons destined for sale to terrorists and insurgents 
throughout Central Asia.35 U.S. policymakers also fear that the Caspian 
could become a smuggling route for weapons of mass destruction.36 
26 See id. at 8-9. 
27 See id. 
28 See id.; Kemp, supra note 8, at 158. 
29 See Ebel & Menon, Introduction, supm note 24, at 7. 
30 The Lost Cause of the Caucasus, THE EcoNoMIST, Nov. 2, 2002, at 25. 
31 Ebel & Menon, Introduction, supra note 24, at 7. 
32 Lena Jonson & Roy Allison, Central Asian Security: Internal and External Dynamics, in 
CENTRAL AsiAN SECURITY: THE NEW INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 13-14 (Lena Jonson & Roy 
Allison eds., 2001). 
33 Id. 
34 See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, jOINT PRESS STATEMENT BY THE U.S.-RUSSIAN WORKING 
GROUP ON COUNTERTERRORISM, http:/ /www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/12224.htm (july 
26, 2002) [hereinafter D.O.S., PRESS STATEMENT]; B. Lynn Pascoe, Security, Stability, Pros-
perity: Engaging the Eurasian Front-Line States, Remarks Delivered at the International Con-
ference on Central Asia and the Caucasus, Y.'lle Center for the Study of Globalization, at 
http:/ /www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2002/13639.htm (Sept. 20, 2002). 
35 Martha Brill Olcott, Drugs, Terrorism, and Regional Security: The Risks from M-
ghanistan, Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee, http:/ /www.ceip.org/ 
files/Publications/OlcottTestimony031302.asp?from=pubtype (Mar. 13, 2002). 
36 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FACT SHEET: U.S. AsSISTANCE TO TURKMENISTAN-
FISCAL YEAR 2002, at http:/ /www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/11037.htm (June 6, 2002); Ka-
licki, supra note 19. 
120 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 27:115 
C. Legal Status of the Sea 
1. UNCLOS and the Law oflnland Lakes 
Neither the international law ofthe sea nor the law of inland lakes 
applies directly to the Caspian Sea. 37 The Caspian is landlocked and has 
traditionally been used only by the states that border it.38 It is therefore 
unlike the waters governed by the law of the sea, which are open to 
navigation by all states.39 Yet, its size, salt water, and hydrocarbon-rich 
seabed also distinguish it from most lakes under international law.40 
Both the law of the sea and the law of lakes have been useful, however, 
in shaping the solutions that the littoral states have advocated.41 
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) essentially provides for the extension of a maritime state's 
land borders 200 miles into the sea.42 The first twelve miles are equiva-
lent to a state's sovereign territory on land, while the remainder is the 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), in which the state enjoys exclusive 
fishing and mining rights.43 
Application of UNCLOS to the Caspian Sea would be complicated 
by the sea's dimensions, since the EEZs of Azerbaijan and Turkmeni-
stan, for instance, which are situated less than 400 miles apart across 
the sea, would overlap.44 In such cases, boundaries are usually drawn at 
a point halfivay between the two coastlines.45 Thus, UNCLOS would 
provide for division of the water and seabed into national sectors 
roughly proportional to the length of each maritime state's coastline.46 
According to one calculation for such a division, Kazakhstan would 
37 See Brice M. Clagett, Ownership of Seabed and Subsoil Resources in the Caspian Sea Under 
the Rules of International Law, CASPIAN CROSSROADS MAG., http:/ /www.usazerbaijancoun-
cil.org/caspiancrossroads/archive/archive.htm (1995); Bernard H. Oxman, Caspain Sea or 
Lake: What Difference Does It Make?, CASPIAN CROSSROADS MAG., http:/ /www.usazerbaijan 
council.org/ caspian crossroads/ archive/ archive.htm ( 1996). 
38 See Clagett, supra note 37; Oxman, supra note 37. 
39 See Clagett, supra note 37; Oxman, supra note 37. 
40 See Oxman, supra note 37. 
41 See id. 
42 See Clagett, supra note 37. 
43 Faraz Sanei, Note, The Caspian Sea Legal Regime, Pipeline Diplomacy, and the Pmspects for 
Iran's Isolation fm11t tlze Oil and Gas Frenzy: Reconciling Tehran s Legal Options with Its Geopoliti-
cal Realities, 34 VAND.j. TRANSNAT'L L. 681,790 (2001). 
44 See Clagett, supra note 37. 
45 See id. The exact method of division was disputed even after UNCLOS, however, 
particularly by states that were not parties to the convention. See id. 
46 Sanei, supra note 43, at 790. 
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control 29.9% of the Caspian; Azerbaijan, 20.7%; Turkmenistan, 
19.2%; and Russia and Iran-only 15.6% and 14.6%, respectively.47 
Not surprisingly, in the 1990s Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan argued 
in favor of applying UNCLOS to the Caspian Sea, aiming to push 
ahead with big oil projects off their coasts.48 In recent years, however, 
they have come to support the Russian proposal, which incorporates 
the UNCLOS concept most important for their interests-division of 
the seabed into proportional national sectors.49 
If the Caspian were treated as a lake, ownership of its mineral 
resources would not differ substantially from an arrangement under 
UNCLOS.50 Rather, the key difference would lie in the use of its sur-
face waters. 51 The surface waters of international lakes, unlike those of 
seas, can be used exclusively by the states bordering them. 52 Russia has 
borrowed this principle for the "common waters" element of its pro-
posed solution.53 
2. Soviet-Iranian Treaties and the "Condominium" Principle 
Much of the current legal dispute regarding the Caspian focuses 
on treaties signed in 1921 and 1940 by the Soviet Union and Iran.54 
The treaties provide for exclusive use of the Sea by the Soviet Union 
and Iran, but cover only fishing and navigation rights, not mining 
rights.55 The 1940 treaty further stipulates a ten-mile fishing zone ex-
tending from each state's shoreline.56 
Iran argues that the Soviet era treaties provide for common man-
agement of the seabed and waters outside the ten-mile zone, according 
47 Clagett, supra note 37. 
48 See Kamyar Mehdiyoun, Current Development, Ownership of Oil and Gas Resources in 
the Caspian Sea, 94 AM.J. INT'L L. 179, 183, 187 (2000). 
49 See Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del Rossiiskoi Federatsii, Departament lnformatsii i 
Pechati, Interviu spetsialnogo predstavitelia Prezidenta Rossii po ureguliro\·aniiu statusa 
Kaspiiskogo moria, zamestitelia Ministra inostrannykh del V.I. Kaliuzhnogo [Russian Min-
istry of Foreign Mfairs, Dep't of Information and Press, Interview of the Special Represen-
tative of the President of Russia for Regulation of the Status of the Caspian Sea, Deputy 
Foreign Minister Viktor I. Kalyuzhny], at http:/ /www.mid.ru (May 23, 2002) [hereinafter 
Kalyuzhny Interview]. 
5o See Clagett, supra note 37. 
51 See Oxman, supra note 37. 
52 See id. 
53 See id.; Lelyveld, Russia: Will a New Formula for Sharing Caspian Riches Work?, RADIO 
FREE EUROPE-RADIO LIBERTY (Nov. 28, 2001), at http:/ /www.rferi.org/nca/features/ 
2001/11/28112001091055.asp [hereinafter Lelyveld, Sharing Caspian Riches]. 
54 D.O.E., LEGAL IssuEs, supra note 7; see Sanei, supra note 43, at 768--87. 
55 See Sanei, supra note 43, at 769-70. 
56 I d. 
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to the "condominium" principle. 57 Under such an arrangement, any oil 
exploration and drilling operations undertaken in the Caspian would 
have to meet the approval of all the bordering states. 58 As a result, Iran 
suggests that Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan should sus-
pend their oil and gas producing activities in the Caspian until a new 
multilateral agreement is reached.59 Russia also argued for this ap-
proach in the early 1990s, but it has recently begun supporting a divi-
sion of the seabed and common management ofthe surface waters.60 
3. Recent Developments: Russia's Proposed Solution 
In 1998, Russia moved closer to the Azerbaijani and Kazakhstani 
positions by accepting division of the seabed into proportional national 
sectors, but still insisted on common management of the surface wa-
ters.61 In the spring and early fall of 2002, Russia signed agreements 
with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan recognizing national sectors based on 
lines drawn in the middle of the sea halfway between each state.62 Rus-
sian diplomats have also succeeded in persuading Azerbaijan and Ka-
zakhstan to support Russia's "divided bottom, common waters" position 
in multilateral negotiations on the sea's status among the five states.63 
Thus, there is now general agreement among Russia, Azerbaijan, and 
Kazakhstan on both the principle and the method of dividing rights to 
the seabed and the oil beneath it.64 
For Russia, coming to advocate this position has meant dropping 
any "Soviet" claims to the oil-rich areas off the coast of Kazakhstan and 
Azerbaijan, and giving up its struggle to block the BTC oil pipeline.65 
57 See Abbas Maleki, Caspian Sea and Foreign Policy of Islamic Republic of Iran, joMHURI 
EsLAMI (Tehran), Oct. 23, 2001, at 3, http:/ /www.netiran.com/clippings.html Iran's Share 
of the Caspian Sea (Interview with Mehdi Safari), TEHRAN PERSIAN DAILY, Apr. 18, 2002, at 2, 
http:/ /www.netiran.com/clippings.html [hereinafter Safmi Interview]. See also generally 
Clagett, supra note 37; Oxman, supra note 37 (describing the "condominium" principle in 
in ternationallaw). 
58 See Sanei, supra note 43, at 786-87; Safari Interview, supra note 57. 
59 See Sanei, supra note 43, at 786-87; Safari Interview, supra note 57. 
60 See BRENDA SHAFFER, PARTNERS IN NEED: THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP OF RUSSIA 
AND IRAN 51 (2001). 
61 Mehdiyoun, supra note 48, at 187. 
62 Steven Lee Myers, Carving Up the Caspian, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2002, at A13; Blagov, 
Kazakhstan, supra note 11. 
63 Lelyveld, Sharing Caspian Riches, supra note 53; Kalyuzhny Interview, supra note 49. 
Turkmenistan favors division of the seabed into national sectors, but is unwilling to com-
mit to the method of division proposed by Russia. See Kalyuzhny Interview, supra note 49. 
64 See Kalyuzhny Interview, supm note 49. 
65 See Carol Saivetz, Caspian Geopolitics: The View from Moscow, 7 BROWN J. WoRLD AFF. 
53, 54-55 (2000). 
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Russia has made these concessions for several reasons.66 Most 
significantly, under President Vladimir Putin 's leadership, Russia has 
become more engaged in the negotiation process and sought to maxi-
mize Russia's share of economic wealth and diplomatic influence in the 
Caspian.67 Also, Russia has repaired its pipelines to Western markets, 
built a new pipeline that bypasses the troubled republic of Chechnya, 
and completed a joint project with Kazakhstan to transport oil through 
a new pipeline that crosses Russia.68 Furthermore, Russian oil compa-
nies, such as LUKoil, have pushed the Russian Foreign Ministry to 
make a deal with Russia's neighbors so that they can proceed with their 
own extraction activities in the Caspian.69 LUKoil is already working in 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan and in new oil fields discovered off Russia's 
Caspian shores. 70 Russia has also proposed an oil export deal with the 
United States and become a partner in the U .S.-led "war on terror. "71 
In contrast to Russia, Iran has shown little willingness to com-
promise.72 In addition to common management of the entire sea and 
seabed, Iran's negotiators have proposed an alternative solution: divi-
sion of the sea into five equal national sectors (twenty percent 
each)-a position which none of the other states supports.73 Moreo-
ver, Iran has recently attempted to force concessions from the other 
Caspian states by demonstrating its potential as a spoiler.74 In July 
2001, an Iranian gunboat chased two BP survey ships from a disputed 
oil field in the southern Caspian.75 BP immediately suspended all ac-
tivity under its contract with Azerbaijan in the disputed oil field.76 
Both the United States and Russia protested the Iranian action.77 
The July 2001 incident underscored Iran's isolation, and events 
since then have demonstrated the extent to which the other Caspian 
66 See Fiona Hill, Russia: The 21st Century's Energy Superpowerr, 20 BROOKINGS REV. 28 
(2002) [hereinafter Hill, Superpower]. 
67 See Saivetz, supra note 65, at 57-59. 
68 D.O.E., EXPORT OPTIONS, supra note 6; Kalicki, supra note 19. 
69 See Hill, Superpowe1; supra note 66. 
70 DEP'T OF ENERGY, AzERBAIJAN, supra note 23; DEP'T OF ENERGY, KAZAKHSTAN, supm 
note 22; see Hill, Superpower, supra note 66. 
71 See Brenda Shaffer, The U.S. Needs Russia to Help Contain Iran, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 21, 
2002, at 13. 
72 See Maleki, supra note 57. 
78 See id. 
74 Michael Lelyveld, Caspian: A Delicate Balance Prroails, RADIO FREE EUROPE- RADIO LIB-
ERTY (July 16, 2002), at http:/ /www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/07 /16072002153612.asp 
[hereinafter Lelyveld, Delicate Balance]. 
75 Id. 
76 I d. 
77 ld. 
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states have aligned themselves with Russia.78 Following the unsuccessful 
April 2002 Caspian Summit in Turkmenistan, at which Iran alone in-
sisted on an equal division of the sea, President Putin ordered large-
scale military exercises on the Caspian for August 2002.79 Azerbaijan 
and Kazakhstan also took part in the exercises, but Iran was pointedly 
excluded.80 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Russia's Legal Arguments 
Russia's current legal argument regarding the status of the Cas-
pian Sea can be described as a "divided bottom, common waters" ap-
proach.81 Russia advocates dividing the seabed into national sectors 
corresponding roughly to the amount of shoreline controlled by each 
state, but leaving the surface waters, outside a fifteen-mile territorial 
band, to be managed by all the states in common.82 To resolve dis-
putes arising over claims to overlapping oil fields, Russia proposes de-
veloping sharing agreements on a bilateral basis. 83 
To codify this argument permanently, Russia has concluded bi-
lateral treaties with its neighbors, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.84 These 
treaties cover the northern part of the sea, effectively dividing it into 
Russian, Azerbaijani, and Kazakhstani national sectors.85 
The legal effect of these bilateral treaties in the absence of a new 
multilateral convention is not entirely clear, since it hinges on 
whether the old Soviet-Iranian treaties remain in force, as Iran argues 
78 Jean-Christophe Peuch, Caspian: 'Militarization' of the Sea-Myth or Reality 1, RAmo FREE 
EuROPE-RAmo LIBERTY (June 10, 2002), at http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/06/ 
10062002165929.asp. 
79 !d. 
80 Michael Lelyveld, Russia: Are MoscoliJ's War Games in Caspian Muscle Flexing1, RAmo 
FREE EUROPE-RADIO LIBERTY (Aug. 7, 2002), at http://www.rferJ.org/nca/features/ 
2002/08/07082002161837.asp. 
8! Putin Address, mpra note 10. 
82 Michael Lelyveld, Caspian: Russia Proposes Wider Offshore Zone for Dividing the Sea, RA-
mo FREE EUROPE-RADIO LIBERTY (Aug. 28, 2002), at http://www.rferi.org/nca/fea-
tures/2002/08/28082002143244.asp. 
83 See Kalyuzhny Interview, supra note 49. 
M See Blagov, Kt1zakhstan, supra note 11; Michael Lelyveld, Caspian: Azerbaijan, Iran Seek 
NeliJ Phase in Border Dispute, RAmo FREE EuROPE-RADIO LIBERTY (June 18, 2002), at 
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2004] Russia's Plan far Ownership of the Caspian Sea 125 
they do.86 If the Soviet era treaties dissolved along with the Soviet Un-
ion in 1991, or if they never effectively governed ownership of the 
Caspian, then the new bilateral treaties between Russia, Azerbaijan, 
and Kazakhstan should be governing law in the Caspian.87 If, however, 
the old Soviet era treaties are still in force, then Iran may have a legal 
foothold for its argument that no new bilateral treaties are valid in the 
absence of a new multilateral agreement.88 
B. Iran's Legal Arguments 
Iran contends that the 1921 and 1940 Soviet-Iranian treaties will 
remain in force until a new multilateral convention is agreed upon by 
all five littoral states.89 Furthermore, Iran demands that any new multi-
lateral agreement provide for common management of both the sur-
face waters and the seabed, or, alternatively, for division of the sea into 
equal national sectors-twenty percent each.90 
Iran's legal argument concerning the treaties has four main weak-
nesses.91 First, it gives great weight to general Soviet-Iranian treaties that 
make little mention of the Caspian, and are completely silent about 
division or ownership of the seabed.92 Second, it argues for a common 
ownership regime of the Caspian's resources when in fact such a re-
gime is not explicit in the treaties.93 Such a common ownership regime 
would, therefore, have to be inferred, but neither the Soviet Union nor 
Iran treated the Caspian as joint property during the Soviet era.94 
Third, the Soviets engaged in oil extraction activities outside the ten-
mile exclusive fishing zone stipulated in the treaty, with no objection 
from lran.95 Some have suggested that Iran's silence about de facto di-
visions during the Soviet era should preclude it from raising objections 
86 See Sanei, supra note 43, at 777-80, 786-87. 
87 See id. 
86 See id. 
89 Maleki, supra note 57, at 3. 
90 ld. 
9! See Mehdiyoun, supra note 48, at 188-89; Clagett, supra note 37. But cf Sanei, supra 
note 43, at 786-87. 
92 See Mehdiyoun, supra note 48, at 188-89; Clagett, supra note 37. But cf Sanei, supra 
note 43, at 786-87. 
93 See Mehdiyoun, supra note 48, at 188-89; Clagett, supra note 37. But cf Sanei, supra 
note 43, at 786-87. 
94 See Mehdiyoun, supra note 48, at 188-89; Clagett, supra note 37. But cf Sanei, supra 
note 43, at 786-87. 
95 See Mehdiyoun, supra note 48, at 188-89; Clagett, supra note 37. But cf Sanei, supra 
note 43, at 786-87. 
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to national divisions today.96 Finally, Iran has refused to recognize the 
continued validity of the 1921 and 1940 treaties in other areas they 
governed, such as security. 97 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Implications for Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan 
If Russia's proposed solution becomes codified as international 
law--either as a system of bilateral agreements, or as the basis for a new 
Caspian convention-Russia will likely be the biggest winner for several 
reasons.98 First, playing a visible role in securing a legal regime will al-
low Russia to be seen as a stabilizing force in the region.99 Second, Rus-
sia's close cooperation with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan on this narrow 
legal question will facilitate reciprocal cooperation from those states on 
problems Russian leaders care deeply about, such as the instability in 
Chechnya.100 Third, division of the seabed into national sectors helps 
influential Russian oil companies to pursue development of recently 
discovered reserves in the Russian sector, as well as to engage in joint 
activities with Azerbaijani and Kazakhstani counterparts.l01 Finally, the 
"common waters" approach will give Moscow a free hand to patrol the 
Caspian and fight what it calls crime and terrorism as it deems neces-
sary.102 
Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have traditionally been cautious in 
their bilateral relations with Russia regarding the Caspian.103 However, 
the chief advantages of the Russian solution for Azerbaijan and Ka-
zakhstan are the clarity of sovereign rights, and, at least in the short 
96 See Mehdiyoun, supra note 48, at 188-89; Clagett, supra note 37. But cf. Sanei, supra 
note 43, at 786-87. 
9' See SHAFFER, supra note 60, at 63 n.46. 
98 See Kalyuzhny Interview, supra note 49; Hill, Superpower, mpra note 66. 
99 See Saivetz, supra note 65, at 59. 
100 See Sergei Blagov, Russia s Asian Policy Gains Momentum, AsiA TIMES ONLINE, Nov. 14, 
2002, at http:/ /www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/DK14Ag0l.html (discussing Kazakh-
stan's cooperation with Russia in counterterrorist operations); Daan van der Schriek, Moscow 
Hostage Crisis Encoumges Closer Russian-Azerbaijani Relations, at http:/ /www.eurasianet.org/de-
partments/insight/articles/eav103002.shtml (Oct. 30, 2002) (discussing Azerbaijan's clamp-
down on Chechen activity in its territory and the recent Azerbaijani-Russian rapproche-
ment). 
101 See Hill, Supe1power, supra note 66. 
1o2 See Peuch, supra note 78. 
103 See generally Hooman Peimani, Russia Navigates Another Caspian Rapid, AsiA TIMES 
ONLINE, Oct. 8, 2002, at http:/ /www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/DJ08Df05.html. 
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run, cooperative relations with their Russian neighbor.l04 Azerbaijan 
and Kazakhstan would no doubt prefer a multilateral legal regime 
codifying the seabed boundaries, which would make abrogation by 
any one party more difficult.105 Nonetheless, given their interest in 
securing their rights sooner rather than later, and Iran's in transi-
gence, a system of bilateral treaties may be the best solution Azerbai-
jani and Kazakhstani leaders can hope for at the present time_l06 
B. Implications for the United States 
The "divided bottom, common waters" approach offers several 
benefits for U.S. interests.l07 The chief priorities of U.S. policy toward 
the Caspian region continue to be the security of energy transport 
routes, independence of the former Soviet Caspian states, and isola-
tion of Iran. los A Caspian legal regime that creates definite bounda-
ries and gives each border state sovereign control over the resources 
in its national sector will favor these interests.t09 
A multilateral agreement based on clear national sectors for the 
seabed and common management of most of the surface waters would 
also be an encouraging sign for U.S. investors in the region.l 10 The ac-
tual borders would have to be drawn, and disputes resolved over over-
lapping claims to oil and gas fields lying between two sectors, but the 
series of bilateral agreements already in place would help demarcate 
borders.l 11 The U.S. government has an additional stake in the success 
of some Caspian investment projects, having provided risk insurance to 
the corporations investing in the BTC pipeline through U.S. govern-
ment financial institutions, including the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation (OPIC) and the Export-Import Bank (Ex-lm Bank).112 
104 See Blagov, Kazakhstan, supra note 11. 
105 See, e.g., Peimani, supra note 103. 
106 See Blagov, Kazakhstan, supra note 11. 
107 See Michael Lelyveld, U.S.: Official Disputes Iranian Success with Caspian Pmject, RADIO 
FREE EuROPE-RADio LIBERTY (Oct. 18, 2002), at http:/ /www.rferl.org/nca/features/ 
2002/10/18102002170429.asp. 
1os See Kuniholm, supra note 13. 
109 See id. 
no See D.O.E., LEGAL IssuEs, supra note 7; Michael Lelyveld, Iran/Azerbaijan: U.S. Rejects 
Military Involvement in Caspian Dispute, RADIO FREE EuROPE-RADio LIBERTY (Mar. 15, 
2002), at http:/ /www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/03/15032002113328.asp [hereinafter 
Lelyveld, Caspian Dispute]. 
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112 See Kuniholm, supra note 13. 
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The United States also has important security concerns in the Cas-
pian region with regard to its ''war on terror. "113 Russian predominance 
in the Caspian region may have distinct advantages for the United 
States in this respect. 114 Both the United States and Russia, for instance, 
have strong interests in keeping terrorists away from pipelines and oil-
rigs, although they may disagree on the best means for doing so.115 
Moreover, Russia's security interests will ensure its engagement in the 
region for the foreseeable future, while Russia's proximity to and fa-
miliarity with the region make it better positioned than the United 
States to act on issues of mutual concern.116 
Nevertheless, for the long run, the United States should consider 
carefully the implications of Moscow's taking on a role as a unilateral 
military and police power in the Caspian.ll7 Such a course may be ex-
pedient while U.S. and Russian interests overlap, but it will be difficult 
to intervene if Russian leaders begin to act on interests that conflict 
directly with those of their neighbors and partners.118 
C. Implications for Iran 
For Iran, the Russian-backed, "divided bottom, common waters" 
approach offers several disadvantages.ll9 First, it will deny Iran key eco-
nomic opportunities.120 The plan effectively excludes Iran from any 
significant development of the Caspian's oil and gas, since the fourteen 
percent share that would be allocated to Iran contains the least proven 
oil and gas reserves and the deepest water.I21 Meanwhile, proactive 
treaty-making by Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan is rapidly closing 
off Iran's ability to bargain for things it desires most, such as securing 
support for a future oil export route south through its territory.122 
113 See Assistant Secretary of State Beth Jones, U.S. Engagement in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus: Staying Our Course Along the Silk Road, Remarks at "Central Asia: Its Geopo-
litical Significance and Future Impact" Conference, University of Montana, at http:/ I 
www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2003/19606.htm (Apr. 10, 2003). 
114 See D.O.S., PRESS STATEMENT, supra note 34; Lelyveld, Caspian Dispute, supra note 
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note 7. 
120 See D.O.E., CASPIAN SEA REGION, supra note 4. 
121 Jd. 
122 See Sanei, supra note 43, at 832. 
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Second, Iran also fears instability in the region.I23 Specifically, 
Iran has concerns that any strengthening of Azerbaijan will embolden 
Iran's significant ethnic Azerbaijani population, possibly leading to 
political and social upheaval in the northern parts of the country that 
border Azerbaijan.l 24 Furthermore, Iran's feelings of insecurity may 
be exacerbated by tacit U.S. support for Russia's legal solution for the 
Caspian.125 The possibility of a large U.S. military presence on Iran's 
border, depending on future events in Iraq, will heighten feelings of 
insecurity in Tehran.I26 
Iran may yet win some concessions in a final agreement on the 
Caspian's status, but given the current situation, that scenario looks 
unlikely.I27 In the absence of a multilateral agreement involving all 
five Caspian states, it is difficult to see how the bilateral treaty system 
created by Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan will prevent further 
conflict arising over the disputed oil fields in the southern part of the 
sea.128 If Iranian leaders decide they have nothing to lose, they may 
seek to disrupt other states' activities in the Caspian.l29 Iran would not 
have to engage in actual hostilities to have an impact on the economic 
activities of the Caspian states.130 As the BP incident proved in July 
2001, foreign oil executives have a low tolerance for political uncer-
tainty in the region.131 
CoNCLUSION 
Russia's proposal for resolving the Caspian's legal status is likely 
to emerge as the defining legal framework for the sea-either as part 
of a new Caspian convention or as a system of bilateral treaties. As 
such, Russia's plan offers important benefits to both Russian and U.S. 
economic and political interests in the short term. However, it may be 
an unsound basis for long-term security and strategic interests. In par-
ticular, future events in Iran and Russia may have a profound impact 
on the viability of the Russian-proposed solution. 
123 See BRENDA SHAFFER, BORDERS AND BRETHREN: IRAN AND TilE CHALLENGE OF 
AzERBAIJANI IDENTITY 1-7 (2002); Kuniholm, supm note 13. 
124 See SHAFFER, supra note 123, at 1-7; Kuniholm, supra note 13. 
125 See Kemp, supra note 8, at 158. 
126 See Sanei, supra note 43, at 824. 
l27 See Mehdiyoun, supra note 48, at 188-89. But cf Sanei, supra note 43, at 786-87. 
128 See Peimani, supra note 103. 
129 See id. 
130 Lelyveld, Delicate Balance, supra note 7 4. 
131 See id. 
130 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 27:115 
Developments in Iranian domestic politics could affect Iran's will-
ingness to recognize a Caspian treaty regime that excludes its inter-
ests. The power struggle between President Mohammed Khatami's 
moderate administration and the hard-line clerics who control Iran's 
foreign policy raises questions about the possibility of a leadership 
change and its effect on Iran's relations with its Caspian neighbors. 
Another potential problem with Russia's proposed legal regime is 
that its success or failure is directly linked to the maintenance of good 
relations among the Caspian states. Neither Russia's rapprochement 
with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, nor its antiterror partnership with 
the United States is a significant departure from the country's Russia-
first foreign policy. Rather, both developments indicate a pragmatic 
approach to pursuing Russia's national interests. As those interests 
change in the coming years, they will likely diverge from the interests 
of their neighbors and those of the United States. 
The "divided bottom, common waters" approach is essentially a 
political solution to a legal problem. In the next several years, it will 
help foster cooperation and get the oil flowing. In the longer run, 
however, a number of events, such as leadership changes in Russia or 
Iran or new trouble in Chechnya, may undermine the political foun-
dation of any agreement based on the Russian plan. 
